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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH IN THE 
INTEREST OF: 
: Case No. 990380-CA 
VATO TAHGUV, 
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 
18 YEARS 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
The following points are submitted in reply to the 
arguments presented in Appellee's Responsive Brief. 
POINT I 
THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW TO BE FOLLOWED IN 
THIS CASE IS "WHEN REVIEWING A CONVICTION, AN 
APPELLATE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE FACTS IN A LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT. AN APPELLATE COURT 
SHOULD OVERTURN A CONVICTION FOR INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE WHEN IT IS APPARENT THAT THERE IS NOT 
SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS TO EACH ELEMENT OF 
THE CRIME CHARGED FOR THE FACT-FINDER TO FIND, 
1 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT THE DEFENDANT 
COMMITTED THE CRIME." 
In its Brief at pages 2 and 6, the State asserts that the 
proper standard to be followed is that "this Court reverses 
a juvenile court's findings of fact only if they are clearly 
erroneous in that they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate Court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
The State further indicates that defendant relies on State vs. 
Labrum, 959 P. 2d 120 (Utah App. 1998) in support of the 
standard of review advanced by him. In fact, defendant relies 
on State vs. Lavman, 376 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1999). 
The Layman case was issued by the Utah Supreme Court and 
involved a criminal case which was heard by a Court, not a 
jury. The standard of review in Layman should govern in this 
case. The State cites no authority for the proposition that 
the standard of review should be different for a juvenile 
court than a district court in reviewing a criminal case. The 
case is not about the court's findings of fact but the 
sufficiency of evidence. 
Since defendant's appeal is based on a claim of 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction, this Court 
should focus on whether there is sufficient competent evidence 
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as to each element of the crime charged to satisfy beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. 
POINT II 
THE PROPER STANDARD TO DETERMINE ACCOMPLICE 
LIABILITY IS SET FORTH IN STATE VS. LABRUM, 959 P. 2d 
120 (Utah App. 1998). 
In his brief, defendant argues that State vs. Labrum 
should govern whether defendant may be convicted as an 
accomplice in this case. In its brief, the State ignores 
Labrum except for a brief explanation on page 6 regarding the 
standard of review to be applied in this case. No where else 
does the State attempt to distinguish Labrum from the present 
case or assert that somehow it should not be used by this 
Court in its decision. 
The State cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions 
to support its argument that circumstantial evidence may be 
sufficient to support a finding that one participated as a 
party in the commission of an offense, that in a case based on 
circumstantial evidence, relevant circumstances to establish 
accomplice liability include the presence on an accused in 
proximity to the crime, opportunity, association with persons 
involved in a manner suggesting joint participation, and 
possession of instruments used in the commission of the 
offense and while the defendant's mere presence at the scene 
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of the crime is insufficient to establish accomplice 
liability, his presence may be considered along with the 
Defendant's relation to or companionship with one engaged in 
the crime and the Defendant's actions before, during and after 
the crime. Brief of Appellee p. 8. 
The arguments presented by the State are not in accord 
with Labrum. Labrum was a passenger in an automobile who 
leaned out of the window and fired five (5) bullets at another 
car. He Wcis later convicted and his sentence was enhanced 
based on the trial court's conclusion that he had acted in 
concert with two or more persons. The issue to be determined 
in that case was the involvement of one of the passengers in 
the back seat of the car when the shooting occurred. In order 
to support the sentence enhancement, the State had to prove 
that Behunin, the passenger in the back seat of the car, was 
an accomplice to Labrum. In addition to being in the 
automobile v/hen the shots were fired, Behunin was present the 
following day when Labrum brought a newspaper article into the 
bedroom of McCray, a roommate of Labrum and Behunin. While 
flaunting the article, Labrum bragged "this is what we did; 
this is the shooting that we did." Behunin said nothing to 
confirm or deny his involvement but appeared to McCray to join 
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Labrum in gloating. Labrum burned the newspaper article 
before leaving the bedroom. 
The facts of the Labrum case are sufficiently similar to 
the facts in this case that the rationale of the Labrum case 
should control this case. In the present case, there is some 
evidence that the defendant knew a crime had occurred since 
everybody had seen Joey carry the stuff out of the apartment. 
R. 179 P. 66. That statement, however, does not directly 
place the defendant in the apartment when the property was 
taken. It was not known in what order the boys left the 
apartment, whether they left individually, or together or in 
groups. R. 179 P. 26. Behunin's presence with Labrum when 
Labrum described the crime, gloated and burned the newspaper 
article is similar to defendant being in the apartment without 
doing or saying anything while someone operated the camcorder 
and another was on the telephone trying to sell it. The cases 
cited by the State should not be adopted by this Court since 
the Labrum case is controlling. 
Not all courts have followed the law as argued by the 
State. In People vs. Tavlor. 579 N.E.2d 383 (111. App. 3 
Dist. 1991) the Court stated: 
To convict a person of an offense on a theory of 
accountability, a State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that: (1) the Defendant solicited, 
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aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid another 
person in the planning or commission of the offense; 
(2) this participation took place either before or 
during the commission of the offense; and (3) the 
Defendant had the concurrent specific intent to 
promote or facilitate the commission of the offense. 
(Cites omitted.)Furthermore, criminal responsibility 
may not be imposed simply through guilt by 
association nor by the Defendant's mere presence at 
the scene, nor even by the Defendant's knowledge 
that the offense is being committed. 
See also U.S. vs. Pedroza, 18 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 1996) 
and U.S. vs. Martinez, 844 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
In U.S. vs. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142 (1st Cir. 1995) 
the 
Court stated: 
Aiding and abetting requires that xthe defendant 
[have] associated himself with the venture, 
participated in it as in something he wished to 
bring about, and sought by his actions to make it 
succeed." Cites omitted. "Mere association with the 
principal, or mere presence at the scene of a crime, 
even when combined with knowledge that a crime will 
be committed, is not sufficient to establish aiding 
and abetting liability. 
See also State vs. Roberts, 908 P. 2d 892 (Wash. App. Div. 
1 1996) . 
The guilt of an aider or abettor can be established by 
circumstantial evidence, but such evidence must be both 
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence; evidence which establishes nothing 
more than a suspicion, or even probability, of guilt is not 
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sufficient. Davis vs. State, 436 So.2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1983). See also Short vs. State, 564 N.E.2d 553 (Ind.App. 1 
Dist. 1991). 
Strangely, the State, in its brief at page 13, states 
that "because this case presents no complex or novel 
questions, the State does not request that it be set for oral 
argument or that a published opinion issue." The State would 
have this Court ignore the facts and law of the Labrum case 
and instead adopt case law from Indiana, Arkansas, Missouri, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania and South Dakota which would seem to 
indicate that the State believes the case involves a novel 
question. Defendant urges the Court to follow established 
Utah law and overturn his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in 
the Defendant's opening brief, this Court should reverse the 
conviction of the Defendant. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of February, 2000. 
JOEL D. BERRETT 
Attorney for Appellee 
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